We express Brewka's prioritised default logic (PDL) as argumentation using ASPIC + . By representing PDL as argumentation and designing an argument preference relation that takes the argument structure into account, we prove that the conclusions of the justified arguments correspond to the PDL extensions. We will first assume that the default priority is total, and then generalise to the case where it is a partial order. This provides a characterisation of non-monotonic inference in PDL as an exchange of argument and counter-argument, providing a basis for distributed non-monotonic reasoning in the form of dialogue.
Introduction
Dung's abstract argumentation theory [11] has become established as a means for unifying various nonmonotonic logics (NMLs) [4, 20, 22] , where the inferences of a given NML can be interpreted as conclusions of justified arguments. Abstract argumentation defines "justified arguments" by making use of principles familiar in everyday reasoning and debate. This renders the process of inference in the NML transparent and amenable to human inspection and participation, and serves as a basis for distributed reasoning and dialogue. More precisely, relating NMLs and argumentation is to endow the NML with argumentation semantics. This has already been done for default logic [11] , logic programming [11] , defeasible logic [12] and preferred subtheories [16] . This allows the application of argument game proof theories [15] to the process of inference in these NMLs, and the generalisation of these dialectical proof theories to distributed reasoning amongst computational agents, where agents can engage in argumentation-based dialogues [1, 14, 17] .
Abstract argumentation has been upgraded to structured argumentation theory [3] , one example of which is the ASPIC + framework for structured argumentation [16] . In ASPIC + , arguments are constructed from premises and deductive or defeasible rules of inference. The conclusions of arguments can contradict each other and hence arguments can attack each other. A preference relation over the arguments can be used to determine which attacks succeed as defeats. The arguments and defeats instantiate an abstract argumentation framework, where the justified arguments are determined using Dung's method. The conclusions of the justified arguments are then identified with the nonmonotonic inferences from the underlying premises and rules of inference. The advantages of ASPIC + are that the framework provides a systematic and general method of endowing non-monotonic logics with argumentation semantics, and identifies sufficient conditions on the underlying logic and preference relations that guarantee the satisfaction of various normatively rational desiderata [10] .
This paper endows Brewka's prioritised default logic (PDL) [7] with argumentation semantics. PDL is an important NML because it upgrades default logic (DL) [19] with an explicit priority relation over defaults, so that, for example, one can account for recent information taking priority over information in the distant past. PDL has also been used to represent the (possibly conflicting) beliefs, obligations, intentions and desires (BOID) of agents, and model how these different categories of mental attitudes override each other in order to generate goals and actions that attain those goals [9] .
We prove a correspondence between inferences in PDL and the conclusions of the justified arguments defined by the argumentation semantics. We realise these contributions by appropriately representing PDL in ASPIC + . The main challenges involve understanding how priorities over defaults in PDL can be represented as an ASPIC + argument preference relation, and then applying the properties of this preference relation to prove that the extensions of PDL correspond to the conclusions of justified arguments. This paper has five sections. In Section 2, we review ASPIC + , abstract argumentation, and PDL. In Section 3 we present an instantiation of ASPIC + to PDL when the default priority is total. The key results are the design of an appropriate argument preference relation (Section 3.2), and showing that this argument preference relation guarantees that the conclusions of the justified arguments correspond exactly to the PDL extensions by the representation theorem (Section 3.3). We then investigate some properties and directly prove that the normative rationality postulates of [10] are satisfied (Section 3.4).
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In Section 4 we lift the assumption that the priority order on the defaults is total. Following the pattern of the previous section we generalise the argument preference (Section 4.1) to accommodate for partial order default priorities. We then prove a generalised representation theorem (Sections 4.2) and prove a partial result concerning the satisfaction of the rationality postulates of [10] (Section 4.3). We conclude in Section 5 with suggestions for future work.
Background

Notation Used in this Paper
In this paper: ":=" is read "is defined as". WLOG stands for "without loss of generality". N denotes the set of natural numbers. We denote set difference with −. For two sets A, B, A⊖B := (A − B)∪(B − A) denotes their symmetric difference. If f : X → Y is a function and A ⊆ X, f (A) ⊆ Y is the image set of A in Y under f . For a set X its power set is P (X) and its finite power set (set of all finite subsets) is P fin (X). X ⊆ fin Y iff X is a finite subset of Y , therefore X ∈ P fin (Y ) ⇔ X ⊆ fin Y . Undefined quantities are denoted by * , for example 1/0 = * in the real numbers. Order isomorphism is denoted by ∼ =.
If P, is a preordered set then the strict version of the preorder is a < b ⇔ [a b, b a], which is also a strict partial order. If < is a strict partial order on P and U ⊆ P , then we define the set max < U := {x ∈ U (∀y ∈ U ) x < y} ⊆ U , i.e. the set of all <-maximal elements of U . We define the set min < U analogously. For a set X we define the set of possible strict partial orders on X to be P O(X) := < ⊆ X 2 < is a strict partial order . Similarly, the set of all possible strict total orders on X is T O(X) := < ⊆ X 2 < is a strict total order ⊂ P O(X). We will use the terms "total (order)" and "linear (order)" interchangeably. We will also call totally ordered sets either "tosets" or "chains".
The ASPIC + Framework
Abstract argumentation abstracts from the internal logical structure of arguments, the nature of defeats and how they are determined by preferences, and consideration of the conclusions of the arguments [11] . However, these features are referenced when studying whether any given logical instantiation of a framework yields complete extensions that satisfy the rationality postulates of [10] . ASPIC + [16] provides a structured account of abstract argumentation, allowing one to reference the above features, while at the same time accommodating a wide range of instantiating logics and preference relations in a principled manner. ASPIC + then identifies conditions under which complete extensions defined by the arguments, attacks and preferences, satisfy the rationality postulates of [10] .
In ASPIC + , the tuple L, −, R s , R d , n is an argumentation system, where L is a logical language and − : L → P(L) is the contrary function θ → θ where θ is the set of wffs that are inconsistent with θ. Let θ 1 , . . . , θ m , φ ∈ L be wffs for m ∈ N, R s is the set of strict inference rules of the form (θ 1 , . . . , θ m → φ), denoting that if θ 1 , . . . , θ m are true then φ is also true, and R d is the set of defeasible inference rules of the form (θ 1 , . . . , θ m ⇒ φ), denoting that if θ 1 , . . . , θ m are true then φ is tentatively true. Note R s ∩R d = ∅. For a strict or defeasible rule r = (θ 1 , . . . θ m → / ⇒ φ), we define Ante(r) := {θ 1 , . . . , θ m } ⊆ fin L, 3 and Cons(r) := φ ∈ L. Finally, n : R d → L is a partial function that assigns a name to some of the defeasible rules. For any S ⊆ L we define the set Cl Rs (S) ⊆ L to be the smallest superset of S that also contains Cons(r) for all r ∈ R s such that Ante(r) ⊆ Cl Rs (S). We call Cl Rs the closure under strict rules operator.
In ASPIC + , a knowledge base is a set K := K n ∪ K p ⊆ L where K n is the set of axioms and K p is the set of ordinary premises. Note that K n ∩ K p = ∅. Given an argumentation system and K, arguments are defined inductively: 2. (Inductive) Let A 1 , . . . , A n be arguments with respective conclusions Conc(A 1 ), . . . , Conc(A n ) and premise sets P rem(A 1 ), . . . , P rem(A n ).
If there is a rule r := (Conc (A 1 ) , . . . , Conc (A n ) → / ⇒ φ) ∈ R, then B := [A 1 , . . . , A n → / ⇒ φ] is also an argument with Conc(B) = φ, premises P rem(B) := n i=1 P rem(A i ), T opRule(B) = r ∈ R and set of subarguments Sub(B) := {B} ∪ n i=1 Sub(A i ). Let A be the (unique) set of all arguments freely constructed following the above rules. It is clear that arguments are finite objects in that each argument has finitely many premises, and take finitely many rules to reach its conclusion. We define the conclusion map Conc : A → L : A → Conc(A). We can generalise this to arbitrary sets of arguments (abuse of notation):
Conc : P (A) → P (L) : S → Conc(S) :=
A∈S
Conc(A).
(2.1)
Two strict or defeasible rules are equal iff they have the same antecedent sets, consequents and name syntactically in the underlying L. Two arguments are equal iff they are constructed identically as described above. More precisely, we can define equality of arguments inductively. The base case would be two singleton arguments [θ] , [φ] are equal iff θ and φ are syntactically the same formulae. Given n arguments A 1 , . . . , A n and two equal rules r 1 and r 2 (either both strict or both defeasible) with antecedent {Conc (A i )} n i=1 , such that B 1 is the rule r 1 appended to the A i 's, and B 2 is the rule r 2 appended to the A i 's, then B 1 and B 2 are equal arguments.
We say A is a subargument of B iff A ∈ Sub(B) and we write A ⊆ arg B. We say A is a proper subargument of B iff A ∈ Sub(B) − {B} and we write A ⊂ arg B. It can be shown that ⊆ arg is a preorder on Sub(B). A set of arguments is subargument closed iff it is ⊆ arg -down closed. Clearly, for every defeasible rule r in an argument A, there is a subargument of A with r as its top rule, by the inductive construction of arguments.
An argument A ∈ A is firm iff P rem(A) ⊆ K n . Further, SR(A) ⊆ R s is the set of strict rules applied in constructing A, and DR(A) ⊆ R d is the set of defeasible rules applied in constructing A. We also define P rem n (A) := P rem(A) ∩ K n and P rem p (A) := P rem(A) ∩ K p . An argument A is strict iff DR(A) = ∅, else A is defeasible. We can generalise DR ( · ) to sets as well just like Equation 2.1 for Conc ( · ).
Given R ⊆ R d , we introduce the set of all arguments freely constructed with defeasible rules restricted to those in R as the set Args(R) ⊆ A, which are all arguments with premises in K, strict rules in R s and defeasible rules in R. Formally, Args(R) is defined inductively just as how arguments are constructed, but with the choice of defeasible rules restricted to those in R. It is easy to show that this definition is equivalent to
Clearly, Args(R d ) = A. Given R, Args(R) exists and is unique. Let S ⊆ fin A. The set of all strict extensions of S is the set StExt (S) where
A set S ⊆ A is closed under strict extensions iff for all T ⊆ fin S, StExt (T ) ⊆ S. Proof. If A ∈ Args(R) and
An argument A attacks another argument B, denoted as A ⇀ B, iff at least one of the following hold, where:
1.
A is said to undermine attack B on the (singleton) subargument B ′ = [φ] iff there is some φ ∈ P rem p (B) such that Conc(A) ∈ φ.
2.
A is said to rebut attack B on the subargument B ′ iff there is some B ′ ⊆ arg B such that r := T opRule (B ′ ) ∈ R d , φ := Cons(r) and Conc(A) ∈ φ.
3.
A is said to undercut attack B on the subargument B ′ iff there is some
See [16, Section 2] for a further discussion of why attacks are distinguished in this way. We abuse notation to define the attack relation as ⇀ ⊆ A 2 such that (A, B) ∈ ⇀ ⇔ A ⇀ B. Notice that by the transitivity of ⊆ arg , if A ⇀ B and B ⊆ arg C, then A ⇀ C.
A preference relation over arguments is then used to determine which attacks succeed as defeats. We denote the preference ⊆ A 2 (not necessarily a preorder for now) such that A B ⇔ B is at least as preferred as A. Strict preference and equivalence are, respectively, A ≺ B ⇔ [A B, B A] and A ≈ B ⇔ [A B, B A]. We define a defeat as
That is to say, A defeats B (on B ′ ) iff A attacks B on the subargument B ′ , and B ′ is not strictly preferred to A. Notice the comparison is made at the subargument B ′ instead of the whole argument B. We abuse notation to define the defeat relation as ֒→ ⊆ A 2 such that (A, B) ∈ ֒→ ⇔ A ֒→ B. A set of arguments S ⊆ A is conflict-free (cf) iff ֒→ ∩ S 2 = ∅. 4 Notice that by the transitivity of ⊆ arg and that the preference comparison is made at the defeated subargument, if A ֒→ B and B ⊆ arg C, then A ֒→ C. As relations, ֒→ ⊆ ⇀.
Preferences between arguments are calculated from the argument structure by comparing arguments at their fallible components, i.e. the ordinary premises and defeasible rules. This is achieved by endowing K p and R d with preorders K and D respectively, where (e.g.) r 1 D r 2 iff r 2 is just as preferred or more preferred than r 1 (and analogously for K ). These preorders are then aggregated to a set-comparison relation between the sets of premises and / or defeasible rules of the arguments, and then finally to ⊆ A 2 , following the method in [16, Section 5] . 5 We will use a modified version of this lifting, which will be explained in Section 3.2.
Given the preference relation between arguments, we call the structure A, ⇀, an ASPIC + SAF (structured argumentation framework), or attack graph. Its corresponding defeat graph is A, ֒→ , where ֒→ is defined in terms of ⇀ and as in Equation 2.3.
Given A, ֒→ one can then evaluate the extensions under Dung's abstract argumentation semantics, and thus identify the inferences defined by argumentation as the conclusions of the justified arguments. We now recap the key definitions of [11] . An argumentation framework is a directed graph A, ֒→ , where A is the set of arguments and ֒→ ⊆ A 2 is the defeat relation, such that A ֒→ B means A is a (successful) counterargument against B. The argumentation frameworks we consider are defeat graphs, but this is a general definition.
Let S ⊆ A and A, B ∈ A. S defeats B iff (∃A ∈ S) A ֒→ B. S is conflict-
. The characteristic function is χ : P (A) → P (A), such that χ(S) := {A ∈ A S defends A} ⊆ A. S is an admissible extension iff S is cf and S ⊆ χ(S). An admissible extension S is: a complete extension iff S = χ(S); a preferred extension iff S is a ⊆-maximal complete extension; the grounded extension iff S is the ⊆-least complete extension; a stable extension iff S is complete and defeats all arguments B ∈ A − S.
Let S := {complete, pref erred, grounded, stable} be the set of Dung semantics. An argument A ∈ A is sceptically (credulously) justified under the semantics s ∈ S iff A belongs to all (at least one) of the s-extensions of A, ֒→ .
Instantiations of ASPIC + should satisfy some properties to ensure they are rational [10] . Given an instantiation let A, ⇀, be its ASPIC + attack graph 4 Note that [16] studies two different notions of cf sets: one where no two arguments attack each other, and the other where no two arguments defeat each other. We choose the latter notion of cf as this is more commonplace in argumentation formalisms that distinguish between attacks and defeats, e.g. in [18] . 5 Note there are many other ways to lift a preference < on a set of objects X to compare subsets of X in various ways that are "compatible" with < [2] .
with corresponding defeat graph A, ֒→ . Let E be any complete extension. The Caminada-Amgoud rationality postulates state:
Conc (E) is defined in Equation 2.1.
(Consistency)
Conc(E) is consistent.
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An ASPIC + instantiation is normatively rational iff it satisfies these rationality postulates. These postulates may be proved directly given an instantiation. ASPIC + also identifies sufficient conditions for an instantiation to satisfy these postulates [16, Section 4] , which we will discuss in Section 5.
Brewka's Prioritised Default Logic
In this section we recap Brewka's prioritised default logic (PDL) [7] . We work in first order logic (FOL) of arbitrary signature where the set of first-order formulae is F L and the set of closed first order formulae 7 a.k.a. sentences is SL ⊆ F L, with the usual quantifiers and connectives. Entailment is denoted by |=. Logical equivalence of formulae is denoted by ≡. Given S ⊆ F L, the deductive closure of S is T h(S), and given θ ∈ F L, the addition operator + :
A normal default is an expression θ:φ φ where θ, φ ∈ F L and read "if θ is the case and φ is consistent with what we know, then jump to the conclusion φ even if it does not deductively follow". In this case we call θ the antecedent and φ the consequent. A normal default θ:φ φ is closed iff θ, φ ∈ SL. We will assume all defaults are closed and normal unless stated otherwise. Given S ⊆ SL, a default is active (in S) iff [θ ∈ S, φ / ∈ S, ¬φ / ∈ S]. A finite prioritised default theory (PDT) is a structure T := D, W, < , where the set of facts W ⊆ SL is not necessarily finite and D, < is a finite strict partially ordered set of defaults that nonmonotonically extend W . The priority relation is such that d
All PDTs in this paper are finite.
The inferences of a PDT T = D, W, < are defined by its extensions. Let < + ⊇< be a linearisation of <. A prioritised default extension (with respect to < + ) (PDE) is a set E := i∈N E i ⊆ SL built inductively as: 6 Notice by properties 2 and 3 above Cl Rs (Conc (E)) is consistent. ASPIC + distinguishes this into direct and indirect consistency given that Rs is in general arbitrary and do not have to be the rules of inference of classical logic. We will not make this distinction because our underlying logic will be first order logic (FOL) (Section 3.1). Further, consistency in the abstract logic of ASPIC + is expressed in terms of the contrary function, but since our contrary function will just be classical negation, we can take the usual meaning of consistency in FOL. 7 i.e. first order formulae without free variables 8 We have defined the order dually to [7] so as to comply with orderings over the ASPIC + defeasible inference rules. This goes against the tradition in NML where the smaller item in < is the more preferred one.
E 0 := T h(W ) and (2.4)
where "property 1" abbreviates "φ is the consequent of the < + -greatest 9 default d active in E i ". Intuitively, one first generates all classical consequences from the facts W , and then iteratively adds the nonmonotonic consequences from the highest priority default to the lowest. Notice if W is inconsistent then E 0 = E = F L. For this paper we will assume W is always consistent.
For finite D it can be shown that the ascending chain E i ⊆ E i+1 stabilises at some finite i ∈ N and that E is consistent provided that W is consistent. E does not have to be unique because there are many distinct linearisations of <. We say T sceptically infers θ ∈ SL iff θ ∈ E for all extensions E of T .
A PDT T for which < is a strict total order is a linearised PDT (LPDT). If < is total then there is only one way to apply the defaults in D by Equation 2.5, hence the extension is unique. We will use the notation < + to emphasise that the priority is total, and the notation T + to denote an arbitrary LPDT. For the rest of this paper, if we declare T to be a PDT, we mean T = D, W, < where each component is defined above, and we make no further assumptions on each component. If we declare T + to be an LPDT, we mean T + = D, W, < + where < + is a strict total order on D.
3 From ASPIC + to PDL 1. Our arguments are expressed in FOL, so our set of wffs L is F L.
2. The contrary function − : F L → P (F L) syntactically defines conflict in terms of classical negation. For all θ ∈ F L, θ = {¬θ} unless θ has the syntactic form ¬φ for some φ ∈ F L, then θ = {φ}. As θ is singleton, we will abuse notation and write θ to refer to its element.
3. The set of strict rules R s characterises inference in FOL. Notice R s is closed under transposition, i.e. for all 1
We leave the proof theory implicit. Cl Rs instantiates to deductive closure.
9 See Footnote 8. 10 We will lift this assumption of a total order priority in Section 4.
4. The set of defeasible rules R d is defined as:
with the naming function n ≡ * . Clearly, there is a bijection f where
and we will define the strict version of the preorder
We can see that the strict toset R d , < D is order isomorphic to D, < + .
5. The set of axiom premises is K n = W , because we take W to be the set of facts. Furthermore,
The set A of ASPIC + arguments are defined as in Section 2.2. 12 All arguments are firm because K p = ∅, and so there are no undermining attacks. As n is undefined, no attack can be an undercut. Therefore, we only have rebut attacks,
Defeats are defined as in Equation 2.3. In the next section, we will define the argument preference , based on the strict total order < D over R d .
A Suitable Argument Preference Relation
We wish to define a suitable argument preference relation such that the conclusion set of the stable extension defined by ֒→ corresponds to the extension of the underlying PDT. 13 The first place to look for such a relation is in the existing relations of ASPIC + [16, Definition 19] . However, simple counterexamples can be devised to show the inferences of the PDT and its argumentation counterpart do not correspond.
The difference between PDL and ASPIC + is in how blocked defaults are treated. In PDL, blocked defaults are simply excluded from the extension. In ASPIC + , it is possible to construct arguments with defeasible rules that correspond to blocked defaults. If < + ∼ = < D such that < + is arbitrary, there is no guarantee that the blocked defaults will be positioned in the chain < + such that arguments with blocked defaults are always defeated by arguments with only non-blocked defaults.
14 To ensure that arguments with blocked defaults are defeated and hence the conclusions of the justified arguments form the extension of the PDT, we need to rearrange the rules in R d to take into account the structure of arguments. ASPIC + does allow for explicit reference to argument structure, i.e. we can tell which defeasible rules preceed which within an argument.
Rearranging < D to take argument structure into account captures the PDL meaning of "active" default, because defaults are added to E i when its prerequisite is inferred. This rearrangement will mean that every defeasible rule r corresponding to a blocked default will be less preferred than the rules which make up arguments that rebut the argument with r as its top rule. We now devise a new ASPIC + argument preference relation which incorporates the argument structure into the preorder < D .
More formally, given any strict total order < D on R d , we first define a transformation < D → < SP , where the subscript SP stands for structure-preference. This sorts the defeasible rules in a way compatible with both the priority < D and their logical structure.
The set R d is finite because we have assumed that D is finite (Sections 2.3 and 3.1). Let 
We define a i ∈ R d to be the < D -greatest element of the following set:
The intuition is: a 1 is the most preferred rule whose antecedent is inferred by the conclusions of all strict arguments, a 2 is the next most preferred rule, whose antecedent is amongst the conclusions of all arguments having at most a 1 as a defeasible rule. Similarly, a 3 is the next most preferred rule, whose antecedent is amongst the conclusions of all arguments having at most a 1 and a 2 as defeasible rules, and so on until all of the rules of R d are exhausted. Notice that the second union after the set difference in Equation 3.4 ensures that once a rule is applied it cannot be applied again. We then define < SP as (notice the dual order)
We define the non-strict order to be
This makes sense because i → a i is bijective between R d and {1, 2, 3, . . . , N }. Clearly < SP is a strict total order on R d . We call this the structure preference order on R d , which exists and is unique given < D . This means the transformation < D → < SP is functional, where < D is total on R d . Now let < D be any strict partial order on R d . We define the strict set comparison relation on P fin (R d ) corresponding to < D . For Γ, Γ ′ ⊆ fin R d , the relation ⊳ DEli , called the disjoint elitist order, is defined as follows:
The lifting < D → ⊳ DEli is functional. We will focus on the following special case of ⊳ DEli , where instead of < D we have < SP :
The corresponding strict argument preference is, for A, B ∈ A,
We define the corresponding non-strict preference as
We now show that SP satisfies the following properties.
The following result shows that larger arguments, which potentially can contain more fallible information (i.e. defeasible rules), cannot be more preferred than its (smaller) subarguments. Proof. Let A ∈ A be strict and B ∈ A be arbitrary. Assume for contradiction that A ≺ SP B. As DR(A) = ∅, Equations 3.7 and 3.8 instantiate to: A ≺ SP B ⇔ (∃x ∈ ∅) (∀y ∈ DR(B)) x < SP y, which is impossible by the first bounded quantifier. Therefore, if A is strict, then for all (∀B ∈ A) A ≺ SP B.
Lemma 3.4. Let P, < be a strict toset, then P fin (P ) , ⊳ DEli is also a strict toset, where ⊳ DEli is defined in Equation 3.6, here with < instead of < D .
Proof. We prove ⊳ DEli is irreflexive, transitive and total on P fin (P ), assuming that < is a strict total order on P . 15 To show irreflexivity, assume for contradiction that there is some Γ ∈ P fin (P ) such that Γ ⊳ DEli Γ, which by Equation 3.6 is equivalent to a formula whose first bounded quantifier is "(∃x ∈ ∅)", which is false, so ⊳ DEli is irreflexive. To show transitivity, let n 1 , · · · , n 7 ∈ N, such that
(3.10)
All of these elements a 1 , . . . , g n7 are distinct. If n i = 0 then the corresponding set is empty. Let Γ, Γ ′ , Γ ′′ ⊆ fin P , where
We can picture these sets with the Venn diagram in Figure 3 .1. The solid outer rectangle represents the set P . The three finite sets Γ, Γ ′ , Γ ′′ are the three rectangles within. Each overlapping region has exactly the elements indicated and nothing more. This configuration exhausts all possibilities for Γ, Γ ′ and Γ ′′ .
Γ Γ
. . , e n 5 f 1 , . . . , f n 6 g 1 , . . . , g n 7 Now suppose < permits Γ⊳ DEli Γ ′ ⊳ DEli Γ ′′ , we write this out in terms of elements (Equations 3.11 and 3.12). Γ ⊳ DEli Γ ′ is equivalent to
Note that there are (n 1 + n 6 ) disjuncts in Equation 3.11. Applying the same reasoning as in Equation 3.11, we can see that
There are (n 2 + n 4 ) disjuncts in Equation 3.11. We need to show that Γ⊳ DEli Γ ′′ . By the same reasoning as Equations 3.11 and 3.12, this is equivalent to 
by establishing all of the conjuncts. Given Γ ⊳ DEli Γ ′ ⊳ DEli Γ ′′ , we take the conjunction of Equations 3.11 and 3.12, making (n 1 + n 6 )(n 2 + n 4 ) disjuncts, which is equivalent to the following expression:
As ∧ and ∨ bi-distribute, we have four cases:
This means for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n 1 , we have
, and transitivity of <, we infer
Equations 3.16 and 3.17 imply Γ ⊳ DEli Γ ′′ .
For some 1
This case uses the assumption that < is total. 16 The second and the third bracketed conjuncts in Equation 3.18 are necessary but not sufficient to lead to Γ ⊳ DEli Γ ′′ . Let k 0 be the witness to 1 ≤ k ≤ n 1 and l 0 be the witness to 1 ≤ l 0 ≤ n 4 . As < is total, either a k0 < d l0 or d l0 < a k0 (remember all elements are distinct).
•
In either case, Γ ⊳ DEli Γ ′′ .
3. For some 1 ≤ l ≤ n 6 and 1 ≤ k ≤ n 2 , we have
16 It can be shown that if < is not total, ⊳ DEli is not transitive, see [23, Lemma A.2] .
The irreflexivity of < and the first and last bracketed conjuncts gives a contradiction when you run over all indices, so this case gives a contradiction.
4. For some 1 ≤ l ≤ n 6 and 1 ≤ l ′ ≤ n 4 , we have
This case is similar to the first case -we use transitivity to combine the second and last bracketed conjuncts. This infers the second conjunct of Equation 3.14, which means Γ ⊳ DEli Γ ′′ .
Therefore, in all cases, Γ ⊳ DEli Γ ′′ . This shows ⊳ DEli is transitive on P fin (P ). To show trichotomy, let Γ, Γ ′ ∈ P fin (P ) be arbitrary. We start by assuming Γ = Γ ′ and show exactly one of
.6, we consider the symmetric difference Γ ⊖ Γ ′ . The set Γ ⊖ Γ ′ , < ⊆ P, < is also a finite strict toset. This means there must exist a <-least element x 0 ∈ Γ ⊖ Γ ′ , say. There are two mutually exclusive possibilities. If
This establishes trichotomy. Therefore, P fin (P ) , ⊳ DEli is a strict chain.
Lemma 3.5. The argument preference SP is a total preorder on A.
Proof. We instantiate P, < in Lemma 3.4 to R d , < SP . This is valid because by Equation 3.5 and the discussion aftewards, < SP is a strict total order on R d . Further, Equation 3.7 is Equation 3.6 with < SP instead of < D . Therefore, where
Our PDE is constructed in the usual manner starting from E 0 = T h(∅) by Equation 2.4. Equation 2.5 gives the order of application of the defaults:
, we have ¬c 2 , which blocks d 2 . The unique PDE from this LPDT is E := T h({c 1 , ¬c 2 , c 3 , c 4 }). Now consider the corresponding arguments following our instantiation. We have the defeasible rules
The relevant arguments and sets of defeasible rules are
We illustrate these arguments in Figure 3 .2. Our convention for diagrams is that broken arrows represent defeasible rules, and solid arrows represent strict rules. Solid vertical lines spanning the length of arguments label those arguments. In the diagrams of this paper, defeasible rules with empty antecedent have the symbol ⊤ as a placeholder for their antecedent. is not the case that r 2 is the < D -least defeasible rule, so D ≺ A. Therefore, this argument preference relation does not generate the corresponding stable extension to E.
Suppose now that we do respect the logical structure of the rules and use ≺ SP as our argument preference (Equation 3.8). By applying Equations 3.4 and 3.5, we can show that a 1 = r 3 , a 2 = r 4 , a 3 = r 1 , a 4 = r 5 and a 5 = r 2 . The structure preference order is r 2 < SP r 5 < SP r 1 < SP r 4 < SP r 3 . Notice that this is precisely the order in which the corresponding normal defaults are added in PDL, as Equation 3.21 shows. It is easy to show that the corresponding stable extension under the argument preference ≺ SP corresponds to the PDL inference, because r 2 is now .4, we have r 2 < SP r 1 , which clearly is not the order of how the corresponding defaults are added in PDL. Yet the correspondence still holds, since A 0 ֒→ A 1 because A 0 is strict and strict arguments always defeat any non-strict argument they attack, so the stable extension is the strict extension of {A 0 , B}, the conclusion set of which (after deductive closure) is the extension of the underlying LPDT.
We have now defined the structure-preference argument preference relation SP . Given an LPDT T + , we denote its attack graph to be AG (T + ) := A, ⇀, SP , and its defeat graph to be DG (T + ) := A, ֒→ , where ֒→ is defined by Equation 2.3 with equal to SP .
The Representation Theorem
In this section we state and prove the representation theorem (Theorem 3.14), which guarantees that the inferences with argumentation semantics under the preference SP correspond exactly to the inferences in PDL.
Non-Blocked Defaults
We introduce some concepts to help prove the representation theorem. Let T be a PDT and E = i∈N E i one of its extensions generated from the linearisation < + ⊇<. The set of generating defaults (w.r.t. < + ), GD(< + ), is defined as
Intuitively, this is the set of defaults applied to calculate E following the priority < + . However, the same E can be generated by distinct total orders. (for i = 1, 2) is not active not because it is blocked by ¬c, but rather because it adds no new information.
We wish to distinguish between inactive defaults that conflict with something known and inactive defaults that do not add any new information. We call a default
. Let < + ⊇ < be total and which generates the extension E (Equation 2.5). The set SAD (< + ) of semi-active defaults with respect to the linearisation < + is defined as
Semi-active defaults add no new information. The set of non-blocked defaults is
Proof. It is sufficient to show Equation 3.24 (with Equations 3.22 and 3.23) is the same as the right hand side of Equation 3.25. Let < + generate the extension E and, for notational convenience, we suppress the argument "< + " in the sets for this proof.
18 (⇒) Case 1:
. Clearly, this means Ante(d) ⊆ E. Now assume for contradiction that ¬Conc(d) ∈ E, which means there is some i 0 ∈ N such that ¬Conc(d) ∈ E i0 . What is the relationship between i 0 and j 0 ? There are three possibilities:
, which is also impossible because the E i 's form an ascending chain, so E i0 ⊆ E j0 . Therefore, we get ¬Conc(d) ∈ E j0 and ¬Conc(d) / ∈ E j0 .
Therefore, Equation 3.26 is true for this case and we have
We can take the union of Equations 3.27 and 3.29 to get
Therefore, we have
The result follows from Equations 3.30 and 3.31.
Given E, N BD(< + ) is uniquely determined by Equation 3.25, so we will write N BD(E) instead. Equation 3.25 adapts Reiter's idea of a generating default [19, page 92, Definition 2] to PDL.
We use these concepts to show that the rearrangement of rules < D → < SP , as defined in Equation 3.5, does not change the extension of the LPDT. This is because the manner through which < SP incorporates the argument structure captures the idea of Equation 2.5, which is the method of how PDL incorporates both structure and preference when choosing the "< + -most active" default. 19 then both T and T ′ have the same extension E.
Proof. Let E be the unique extension of T , and E ′ be the unique extension of T ′ . To show E = E ′ , we need to show that they have the same generating defaults, i.e. GD (< + ) = GD < + ′ . As < + ′ ∼ = < SP , and < + ∼ = < D → < SP , the rearrangement < D → < SP will always choose the < D -greatest active defeasible rule for a 1 in Equation 3 .4, the second < D -greatest active defeasible rule for a 2 ... etc. until all defeasible rules are rearranged, but the defeasible rules corresponding to the generating defaults of < + ′ will always be chosen first in the rearrangement, therefore GD (< + ) = GD < + ′ and hence the result follows.
Existence and Uniqueness of Stable Extensions
Let T + be an LPDT. In this section we show that its defeat graph DG (T + ) has a unique stable extension. We propose an algorithm that imitates how PDL extensions are constructed over an LPDT (Equation 2.5). Given S ⊆ A, r ∈ R d , the definition of Args ( · ) (Equation 2.2) and < SP we define ⊕ as S ⊕ r := Args(DR(S) ∪ {r}), i.e. we close S under all arguments over all strict rules, all defeasible rules in S, and the addition of a new defeasible rule r.
Consider Algorithm 1, which takes as input the attack graph AG (T + ) of an LPDT T + , and the strict chain of defeasible rules under the SP order R d , < SP . The output is a set of arguments S ⊆ A. The formal definition is:
S ← {all strict arguments in A} 3:
for r ∈ R d from < SP -greatest to < SP -smallest do 4: if S ⊕ r has no attacks, (S ⊕ r) 2 ∩ ⇀ = ∅, then
5:
S ← S ⊕ r return S Algorithm 1 first creates the largest possible set of undefeated arguments that do not attack each other. This includes all strict arguments as they are never defeated nor do they attack each other, and possibly some undefeated defeasible arguments. Then, the algorithm includes the defeasible rules from most to least preferred under < SP and tests whether the resulting arguments that are constructed by the inclusion of such a defeasible rule attack each other in the sense of Equation 3.3 (Lines 4-5). Note that the resulting attack must originate from the arguments having at most the defeasible rules added so far. As < SP is total, all defeasible rules are considered, and the result includes as many defeasible rules as possible such that the result has no attacks. Adding the rules in the order of < SP while ensuring no attacks mimics the condition of Equation 2.5. It is clear from the algorithm that S exists and is unique given the input, as it is of the form Args(R) for some R ⊆ R d (Equation 2.2) . We show S is a stable extension.
Lemma 3.8. The output S of Algorithm 1 is cf (conflict free).
Proof. cf is guaranteed by the consistency of K n and that defeasible rules r ∈ R d are only added if the resulting arguments do not attack each other (Lines 4 -5). Therefore, by Equation 2.3, S contains no defeats and must be cf.
Note that the setup of the algorithm prevents not just defeats but attacks from appearing in S (Line 4). Normally, this is not sufficient to guarantee that Conc (S) is consistent in FOL.
There are no attacks in S because attacks are defined syntactically (Equation 3.3, page 10).
We now show that if S has no attacks then Conc (S) is consistent in FOL.
Proof. By construction and Lemma 2.1, Conc (S) is deductively closed. Assume for contradiction that Conc (S) is inconsistent, then θ, ¬θ ∈ Conc (S) for some θ ∈ SL. Hence there are A, B ∈ S such that Conc(A) = θ and Conc(B) = ¬θ. If at least one of T opRule(A) or T opRule(B) are defeasible then at least one of A ⇀ B and B ⇀ A is the case, hence S 2 ∩ ⇀ = ∅ -contradiction. Now consider the case where T opRule(A), T opRule(B) ∈ R s are both strict. As W = K n is consistent and the rules in R s are sound, if A and B are both strict then it cannot be the case they have contradictory conclusions. Therefore, at least one of A and B are defeasible. WLOG say A is defeasible. Proof. Let R := DR(S). Let B / ∈ S be an arbitrary argument outside of S. We show there is an A ∈ S such that A ֒→ B. Given that B / ∈ S, there must be some rule r ∈ DR(B)
′ and hence A ⇀ B. There are two possibilities: either this rule r ∈ DR(B) is < SP -greatest, or it is not.
If r is < SP -greatest, then Args(∅) ⊕ r contains attacking arguments, so A must be strict and hence A ֒→ B. If r is not < SP -greatest, then consider the strict
There are two sub-possibilities: either T ∩ R = ∅ or T ∩ R = ∅. If T ∩ R = ∅, then adding r to S will create an attack by Algorithm 1, Line 4, and this attack must originate from some A ∈ Args(∅) because no rule < SP -larger than r is used in the arguments of S, hence A ֒→ B.
If T ∩ R = ∅, then adding r to S means its attacker A ⇀ B ′ is in Args (T ∩ R).
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Either A is strict or not strict (i.e. defeasible). If it is strict, then A ֒→ B as before. If it is not strict, i.e. ∅ = DR(A) ⊆ T ∩ R, then by definition (∀s ∈ T ) r < SP s. As DR(A) ⊆ T ∩ R, we must also have (∀s ∈ DR(A)) r < SP s. Therefore, there is an r ∈ DR(B ′ Proof. Immediate from Lemmata 3.8 and 3.10.
We also have a useful property relating the presence of an argument in a stable extension with its rules, which is independent of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 3.12. For a LPDT
. Assume for contradiction that r ∈ DR(E), then (∃B ∈ E) r ∈ DR(B), so E ֒→ B -contradiction, as E is cf. Therefore, r / ∈ DR (E). But as r ∈ DR(A), DR(A) ⊆ DR (E).
21 Note that A is appropriately chosen such that Conc(A) = Cons(r) is syntactic equality. This is always possible because Rs has all rules of proof of FOL. Therefore, if an argument C concludes θ, and we would want it to conclude φ, where φ ≡ θ, we can just append the strict rule (θ → φ) ∈ Rs to C to create a new argument D that concludes φ. 22 We have A ∈ Args (T ∩ R) because as Algorithm 1 adds the rules one by one according to < SP , if adding r to the rules in S and then creating all arguments (with all strict rules) creates an attack, then this attack must be due to some argument whose defeasible rules are amongst T ∩ R. This is because at the point where the algorithm excludes r, any defeasible arguments constructed then can only have their rules from T .
We have shown that given T + and AG (T + ), Algorithm 1 gives a unique output that is a stable extension (Theorem 3.11). We now show that this is the only stable extension that DG (T + ) can have.
Theorem 3.13. Let E be the stable extension that is the output of Algorithm 1. This is the unique stable extension of DG (T + ).
Proof. Given DG (T + ) = A, ֒→ , let E be the output of Algorithm 1, and assume for contradiction that E ′ = E is some other stable extension of
.. and so on. We therefore construct a defeat chain of defeasible arguments 
As R d is a finite set, there are only finitely many possible sets of defeasible rules. This strictly ascending chain must therefore be finite, say of length n. Equation 3.32 must therefore be of finite length, terminating at an undefeated argument B, which may or may not be strict.
for some n ∈ N + . In the first case, B ∈ E −E ′ is an undefeated argument, so E ′ is not a stable extension -contradiction. In the second case, by similar reasoning, E is not a stable extension -contradiction. There cannot be another stable extension E ′ of DG (T + ), so E is the unique stable extension of DG (T + ).
The defeat graphs DG (T + ) of LPDTs T + thus have a unique stable extension.
The Representation Theorem: Statement and Proof
In this section we state and prove the representation theorem which relates the stable extension of DG (T + ) := A, ֒→ with the extension of the corresponding LPDT T + := D, W, < + . 
.1), which are non-blocked defaults in E, it follows that a ∈ E. As E is deductively closed, this means ¬¬a ∈ E. Now let B ′ ⊆ arg B be the argument such that T opRule(B ′ ) = (b ⇒ ¬a) for some appropriate intermediate conclusion b ∈ Conc (Sub(B)). As B ∈ E, this means (b ⇒ ¬a) ∈ R. By Equation 3.25, this means ¬¬a / ∈ E -contradiction. Therefore, E is cf. To show Args(R) defeats all other arguments, let B / ∈ Args(R) be arbitrary. Let r ∈ DR(B) − R be some rule. Let B ′ ⊆ arg B be such that T opRule(B ′ ) = r. The rule r corresponds to a default f −1 (r) = θ:φ φ / ∈ N BD(E) (Equation 3.1). By Equation 3.25, we have two cases: either θ / ∈ E or ¬φ ∈ E. Case 1: If ¬φ ∈ E, then we now show there exists an argument A ∈ Args(R) such that A ֒→ B ′ and hence A ֒→ B, under SP . By Equations 2.4 and 2.5, there is some i ∈ N such that ¬φ ∈ E i . Suppose i = 0 then W |= ¬φ. Compactness means there is some W ′ ⊆ fin W such that W ′ |= ¬φ. We can construct an argument A such that P rem(A) = W ′ and Conc(A) = ¬φ as there will be appropriate combinations of strict rules in R s and premises in K n , so A ⇀ B. As DR(A) = ∅ ⊆ R, we must have A ∈ Args(R). As A is strict, A ֒→ B is guaranteed by Corollary 3.3 of SP . Now suppose that i > 0, then ¬φ ∈ E j where j > 0 is the witness for i. Let d j ∈ D be the default that is < + -greatest active in the layer E j , so the set of defaults that are used in concluding ¬φ (up to the application of deductive rules) is S := {d 0 , . . . , d j−1 } ⊆ GD j−1 (< + ) ⊆ N BD(E). We can construct an argument A such that P rem(A) ⊆ W , Conc(A) = ¬φ and DR(A) = f (S). Clearly, DR(A) = f (S) ⊆ f (N BD(E)) =: R and hence A ∈ Args (R). It is clear that A ⇀ B, so we need to show A ≺ SP B.
Given that ¬φ ∈ E j , it must be the case that φ / ∈ E j . Therefore, f −1 (r) is not < + -greatest active for all extension layers E 0 , . . . , E j−1 . Suppose for contradiction that there is some rule s ∈ DR(A) such that s < SP r. Then by Equation 3.4, r must be < + -greatest active at some E k for k < j − 1, which would then result in φ in E k+1 , therefore preventing ¬φ ∈ E j -contradiction.
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Therefore, r is < SP -smaller than all rules in DR(A). By Equation 3.8, we must have B ≺ SP A, and hence A ≺ SP B, so A ֒→ B. Therefore, for the case of ¬φ ∈ E, Args(R) defeats all arguments outside it. Therefore, in all cases, if ¬φ ∈ E, there is some argument A ∈ E that defeats B. Case 2: We will assume θ / ∈ E, and show that it leads to a contradiction with the method of infinite descent.
If θ / ∈ E, then there is some proper subargument B ′′ ⊂ arg B ′ such that Conc(B ′′ ) = θ. Since θ / ∈ E then it is the case that neither DR (B ′′ ) = ∅ nor in Args (f (N BD (E)) ). This is because if
.25, we have θ ∈ E. Therefore, as B ′′ is neither strict nor in Args (f (N BD (E))) there is some other defeasible rule s ∈ DR (B ′′ ) − f (N BD (E)). We can repeat the above reasoning with the rule s instead of r: suppose s =
In the latter case we can construct an argument A ′ ∈ E concluding ¬φ ′ which then defeats B ′′ as in the case when we assumed ¬φ ∈ E. In the former case we repeat the reasoning in the previous paragraph, but we cannot do this indefinitely as arguments are well-founded. We will end up with either a proper subargument of B ′′ or an argument in Args (R) concluding θ. In both cases θ ∈ E is true, so assuming θ / ∈ E will lead to contradiction by the method of infinite descent.
Therefore, the only reason for r / ∈ R is because ¬φ ∈ E. We have shown there is an argument A that defeats any argument containing the rule r. As r belongs to some arbitrary B / ∈ E, this means E := Args(R) defeats all arguments outside of it and hence it is a stable extension.
To show that E = Conc (E), we show E ⊆ Conc (E) and Conc (E) ⊆ E. In the first case, let θ ∈ E so there is some i ∈ N such that θ ∈ E i by Equations 2.4 and 2.5.
If θ ∈ E 0 , we have W |= θ so by compactness there is some ∆ ⊆ fin W where ∆ |= θ. Given that R s has all rules of proof we can construct a strict argument A such that P rem n (A) = ∆ and Conc(A) = θ. As strict arguments are undefeated, A ∈ E so θ ∈ Conc (E).
If θ ∈ E k for some k ∈ N + , we can construct a defeasible argument A concluding θ such that DR(A) ⊆ R and hence A ∈ E, so θ ∈ Conc (E). Specifically, we construct an argument whose defeasible rules correspond to the defaults added to E up to E k .
Conversely, if θ ∈ Conc(E) there is an argument in E concluding θ. If this argument is strict then θ ∈ E 0 ⊆ E, else, as the defeasible rules are in R then θ ∈ E k ⊆ E for some k ∈ N + that indicates when all of the appropriate defaults needed to conclude θ are included.
Proof of part 2: We show Conc(E) ⊆ E and E ⊆ Conc(E). For the former, if θ ∈ Conc(E) then there is some A ∈ E concluding θ. If A is strict then θ ∈ E 0 ⊆ E. If A is defeasible, then say DR(A) = {r i } k i=1 for some k ∈ N + . These defeasible rules do not introduce any inconsistency to E by Lemma 3.9. Consider the set of corresponding defaults {d i } k i=1 ⊆ D to DR(A). We can choose the smallest index j ∈ N such that all of the conclusions of these defaults are included in E j ⊆ E. This is because either {d i } k i=1 ⊆ GD(E), or there is some d i ∈ SAD(E), but that would mean cons(d i ) ∈ E so for some l ∈ N, cons(d i ) ∈ E l . Therefore, under deductive closure, θ ∈ E j+1 ⊆ E, so θ ∈ E. This shows that Conc (E) ⊆ E.
Conversely, let θ ∈ E, so there is some i ∈ N such that θ ∈ E i . If i = 0, then there is a strict argument A, necessarily in E as it is undefeated, that concludes θ so θ ∈ Conc (E). If i > 0, then from θ ∈ E i we can consider the defaults added to E i , and use the corresponding defeasible rules to construct an argument A such that P rem(A) ⊆ W , Conc(A) = θ and DR(A) to contain exactly those defeasible rules. By definition of < SP and Algorithm 1, these defeasible rules are all present in E, so DR(A) ⊆ DR (E). By Lemma 3.12, A ∈ E. Therefore, θ ∈ Conc (E). This shows that E ⊆ Conc (E).
Theorem 3.14 means that PDL, where the default priority < is a total order, is sound and complete with respect to its argumentation semantics; the inferences of PDL can be formally seen as the conclusions of justified arguments.
Given the definition of ≺ SP and the translation of a LPDT to its defeat graph as described in Section 3.1, we can visualise the representation theorem in the following diagram:
Satisfaction of Rationality Postulates
In this section, we prove directly that our instantiation of ASPIC + to PDL satisfies the Caminada-Amgoud rationality postulates and hence is normatively rational. We do this by investigating some properties of the stable extension of this defeat graph. Notice that we do not appeal to the sufficient conditions articulated by ASPIC + that, if satisfied, will guarantee normative rationality. We will discuss why in Section 5.
The Stable Extension is Grounded
Lemma 3.15. Let T + be an LPDT with attack graph AG (T + ) and defeat graph DG (T + ). Let χ : P (A) → P (A) be the characteristic function. Let E ⊆ A be the stable extension of DG (T + ). Then (∃n ∈ N + ) E ⊆ χ n (∅), where χ n denotes the n th iterate of χ.
Before we prove Lemma 3.15, we first establish some notation that will be used in the proof. Recall interval notation: for any toset T, < and a, b ∈ T , define the subsets: (a, b) := {x ∈ T a < x < b} , [a, b] := {x ∈ T a ≤ x ≤ b} , [a, b) := {x ∈ T a ≤ x < b} and (a, b] := {x ∈ T a < x ≤ b} .
As D is finite let N := |R d |. Given the LPDT T + with defeat graph DG (T + ) and stable extension E, define the set, for 0 ≤ k ≤ N ,
where k = 0 means DR (E) = R d , and k = N means DR (E) = ∅. WLOG, we arrange the indices for these rules such that r l+1 < SP r l , for 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1. This is the set containing the rules that do not feature in E. Given the strict toset R d , < SP , denote r max := max <SP R d and similarly for r min . Both r max and r min are uniquely defined as < SP is total. To isolate the defeasible rules that do not make up the arguments in E, we partition R d from smallest to largest in < SP as follows:
This places the defeasible rules that do not feature in E into their own singleton sets along the chain < SP . These singleton sets contain precisely the defeasible rules skipped over by Algorithm 1 when constructing E. Note the first and last of these sets may be empty, e.g. when r k = r min . We name these sets: for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, P i := {r i }. Similarly, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k, I i := (r i , r i−1 ) ⊆ R d . We also define I 1 := (r 1 , r max ] ⊆ R d and I k+1 := [r min , r k ) ⊆ R d . Equation 3 .34 can be written as:
Notice from Equation 3 .34 that k+1 j=1 I j = R d − {r k , r k−1 , . . . , r 2 , r 1 } = DR (E). We define the following counterpart sets of arguments to those in Equation 3.35. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, define
These are the sets of defeasible arguments that have at least one rule excluded from E. By Lemma 3.12 and the definition of the P i sets, it is easily shown that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, AP i ∩ E = ∅. Further, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1,
These are the sets of defeasible arguments where the arguments only have rules from these intervals (as subsets of DR (E)), with at least one such rule from the < SP -lowest ranked interval I i . We also define
which by Equation 2.2 is the set of all strict arguments. Clearly AI 0 ⊆ χ (∅).
Lemma 3.16. It is the case that AI 1 ⊆ χ (∅).
Proof. The set AI 1 is cf (conflict free): assume for contradiction that A, B ∈ AI 1 such that A ֒→ B. Then as DR(A), DR(B) ⊆ I 1 ⊆ DR (E), by Equations 3.33 and 3.34 and Lemma 3.12, A, B ∈ E -contradiction, because E is cf. Now assume for contradiction that A ∈ AI 1 is defeated, so there is some B ∈ A such that B ֒→ A. Clearly if B ∈ E, then E is not cf because A ∈ E. Therefore, B / ∈ E. By Lemma 3.12, DR(B) ⊆ DR (E) so for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, DR(B) ∩ P i = ∅. However, by Equation 3.34, there is a rule in DR(B) − DR(A), namely r i , such that it is < SP -smaller than all rules in DR(A) (and hence < SP -smaller than all rules in DR(A) − DR(B)). Therefore, B ≺ SP A, and hence B cannot defeat A. Therefore, all arguments in AI 1 are also undefeated, so AI 1 ⊆ χ (∅).
For the purposes of the proof of Lemma 3.15, we define, for i > k + 1,
Note that the sets of arguments in Equation 3.35 do not partition A, as an argument can conceivably have rules from two or more of the I j sets. We now apply these ideas to prove Lemma 3.15.
Proof. (Proof of Lemma 3.15) Given our setup, let E be the stable extension of DG (T + ). By Theorem 3.13, E is unique and could only have been constructed by Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 begins with Args (∅), then adds rules in R d from < SP -largest to < SP -smallest as long as the resulting set with the rule contains no arguments attacking each other. From the above notation, it is exactly the rules in the sets P i that, when included, create arguments that attack each other. This is why these rules in P i do not feature in E.
We use strong induction to show that for i ∈ N + , AI i ⊆ χ i (∅). The base case, i = 1, follows from Lemma 3.16. For the strong inductive step, assume AI j ⊆ χ j (∅) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i. We will show that AI i+1 ⊆ χ i+1 (∅). Let A ∈ AI i+1 be arbitrary. This means DR(A) ⊆ AI s B ֒→ C, s = 0 is included as B may be strict,
s (∅)) B ֒→ C by our strong inductive hypothesis.
This means A is defended by χ s (∅), so A ∈ χ s+1 (∅), for some 0 ≤ s ≤ j 0 . As s ≤ j 0 ≤ i, this means s ≤ i and hence s + 1 ≤ i + 1. By ⊆-monotonicity of χ, A ∈ χ i+1 (∅). This establishes the inductive step. However, this proof by induction proves this for all i ∈ N + . What happens
and we have no more defeasible rules to add. As the sequence AI i stabilises the result holds for all i ∈ N + trivially. Now, as ∅, χ (∅) , χ 2 (∅) . . . form an ⊆-increasing sequence in P (A), we can take the union of the equations AI i ⊆ χ i (∅) and invoke monotonicity of χ:
We then take the union of both sides with the set of all strict arguments. The left hand side becomes E. This is because the union of the AI j sets from j = 0 to k + 1 means any argument in that set cannot have any rules in the P k sets, and therefore DR(A) ⊆ DR (E) and hence A ∈ E by Lemma 3.12.
As the set of all strict arguments is contained in χ (∅) because they are undefeated, the right hand side stays the same. Therefore, we obtain E ⊆ χ k+1 (∅), where 0 ≤ k ≤ N ∈ N is the number of defeasible rules blocked from E, which is a natural number.
25 This shows the result. 
Proof. Immediate by induction on n: χ is ⊆-monotonic and G is complete.
We now instantiate the abstract framework A, ⇀ in Lemma 3.17 to the defeat graph A, ֒→ of a LPDT. Proof. From Lemma 3.15, there exists some n ∈ N such that E ⊆ χ n (∅). From Lemma 3.17, we have χ n (∅) ⊆ G, where G ⊆ A is the grounded extension. But by definition, G ⊆ E because stable extensions are complete. Therefore, we have, for this n ∈ N, G ⊆ E ⊆ χ n (∅) ⊆ G, so E = G.
24 Strictly speaking the union should be over all i ∈ N but because the AI i sequence stabilises we only have to care about 0 ≤ i ≤ k + 1.
25 Notice if k = 0, there is no conflict, all arguments in E are undefeated, so E ⊆ χ (∅).
The Trivialisation and Rationality Theorems
The trivialisation theorem states that if the underlying default priority is total, then all of Dung's argumentation semantics are equivalent. Proof. Let C be any complete extension of A, ֒→ , which means C is cf and χ (C) = C. Let G be the grounded extension, then G ⊆ C by definition. As the (unique) stable extension E is grounded by Corollary 3.18, we have G = E, therefore E ⊆ C. This means either E = C or E ⊂ C. In the latter case, there will be some B / ∈ E such that B ∈ C, but as E ⊂ C is stable, we must have some A ∈ E (so A ∈ C) such that A ֒→ B. Therefore, C is not cf -contradiction. Therefore, C = E. As E is unique, C is unique. Therefore, A, ֒→ has a unique complete extension that is grounded, stable and hence preferred.
We now prove that this instantiation of ASPIC + to PDL satisfies the requirements for normative rationality [10] . Recall that when instantiated to FOL, Cl Rs becomes deductive closure. Proof. By Theorem 3.13, A, ֒→ has a unique stable extension E, which is a complete and an admissible extension. It is sufficient to prove the postulates for E because by Theorem 3.19, A, ֒→ only has E as its sole complete extension.
1. To show that E is subargument closed, recall that Algorithm 1 gives an explicit construction of E, which is of the form Args(R) for some R ⊆ R d which is subargument closed (Equation 2.2).
2. The representation theorem states that Conc (E) = E and as E is deductively closed, Conc (E) is closed under strict rules.
3. As W is consistent and Conc (E) is the extension, Conc (E) must also be consistent and its deductive closure is consistent.
This shows the result.
The rationality theorem establishes that this instantiation of ASPIC + to PDL satisfies all of the Caminada-Amgoud rationality postulates and is a normatively rational instantiation of ASPIC + . Finally, the consistency of E on the side of PDL allows us to establish a stronger notion of cf for E on the side of argumentation. This is already implicit in Algorithm 1 Line 4. Proof. Given the hypotheses, assume for contradiction that A ⇀ B for A, B ∈ E. WLOG we can assume that Conc(A) = θ and Conc(B) = ¬θ with T opRule(B) ∈ R d , by Equation 3.3 and that E is subargument closed. Therefore, Conc (E) is inconsistent, because θ, ¬θ ∈ Conc (E). This violates the Rationality Theorem -contradiction. Therefore, no two arguments in E attack each other.
Inconsistent Arguments
We have stated in Section 2.2 that arguments are constrcted freely from the premises and rules. In this instantiation, it is possible to construct arguments that are inconsistent, either in their intermediate conclusions or their conclusion. We call an argument inconsistent iff Conc (Sub(A)) ⊆ F L is an inconsistent set in FOL. It is possible to construct such arguments in A. We can ignore these arguments by focussing on A − {A ∈ A A is inconsistent} and restricting ⇀ in the usual way, but this seems inelegant especally when the process of argumentation is meant to resolve inconsistencies. If we do include inconsistent arguments, the very least is that they should not be justified. By Theorems 3.13 and 3.19, there is only one way of justifying arguments: an argument A is justified iff A ∈ E. Lemma 3.9 and Corollary 3.21 ensure that if A is inconsistent, then A / ∈ E. In summary, although it is possible to have inconsistent arguments in A, they can never be justified and we do not need to be concerned with them.
Summary
In this section, we have provided an argumentative characterisation of PDL inference that is sound, complete and normatively rational, in the case where our default priority is a strict total order. We can construct ASPIC + arguments and attacks (Section 3.1). The structure-preference relation, SP , takes into account both the default priority < and the logical structure of arguments. This is motivated by how PDL adds defaults when constructing extensions (Section 3.2). The representation theorem states that under SP , the PDL extension and the conclusion set of the stable extension correspond exactly (Section 3.3, Theorem 3.14). We can prove directly that the stable extension of interest satisfies the Caminada-Amgoud rationality postulates (Section 3.4, Theorem 3.20). As this is the only complete extension of our defeat graphs, our instantiation satisfies the postulates. Finally, we do not need to explicitly prevent the construction of inconsistent arguments, because they are never justified (Section 3.4.3).
On Lifting the Assumption of a Total Order Default Priority
In Section 3, we have provided an argumentative characterisation of PDL inference where the default priority < is a strict total order. It seems that we have lost generality but this is not the case because calculating an extension in PDL always presupposes a linearisation < + of < (Section 2.3), and Theorem 3.14 shows that for any such linearisation the correspondence of inferences between PDL and its argumentation semantics holds.
But argumentation can also define argument preference relations based on an underlying partial order. We now investigate how to lift the assumption that < is total for the LPDT T + , such that the resulting multiple stable extensions each correspond to an extension of the underlying PDT T . Our underlying representation of PDL in ASPIC + is the same as in Section 3.1, but now < D is a strict partial order.
The Argument Preference Relation based on Partial
Order Default Priorities
In Section 3.2, we devised the structure-preference (SP) argument preference relation SP which captures the PDL idea of adding the "< + -greatest active" default (Equation 2.5). If we translate a PDT T directly into an argument graph AG (T ) without first linearising <, the generalised version of SP should take into account the incomparabilities of rules while still respecting their logical structure. We formalise this idea by defining a string representation of the rules that will be used in an algorithm to calculate < D → < SP for partial < D . We will give a variation of the Penguin Triangle (Example 8) as a running example.
A Representation of Rules and their Ordering using Strings
Let rulenames be a set of characters, with as many characters as there are rules in R d . Let g : R d → rulenames be a bijection such that each r ∈ R d has a single-character name 26 g(r). Let ⋆ denote the Kleene star and * denote string concatenation, 27 and len : rulenames ⋆ → N returns the number of letters of the string. We will also assume that in each string σ ∈ rulenames ⋆ there is an index assocated with each letter starting from 0 and ending in len (σ) − 1. To iterate over the letters l of the string σ we will write l ∈ σ, which starts from the letter at index 0 and terminates at the letter at index len (σ) − 1. The empty string is ε := "" with len (ε) = 0. We may put quotation marks around strings to emphasise that they are strings.
For R ⊆ R d such that R := {r 1 , . . . , r k }, we can form the string g(r 1 ) * g(r 2 ) * · · · * g(r k ), written g(r 1 )g(r 2 ) · · · g(r k ). Notice that forming a string from a set imposes an order on the elements.
) = "a", g (r 2 ) = "b", g (r 3 ) = "c", g (r 4 ) = "d" and g (r 5 ) = "e". Then for the set S = {r 1 , r 2 , r 5 } we can form the strings (e.g.) "abe" or "bea", depending on which order we choose the rules to be in.
As g is a bijection we can define the reverse process. Suppose we have a string σ. We define the set of rules that are encoded by the letters of σ as follows:
Notice that we lose the information about the index, but we will see that it does not matter. Notice also that if σ = ε then we have the empty union so the set of rules encoded by ε is ∅.
Example 7. (Example 6 continued) Suppose we want to find the set of the string "ace". Applying Equation 4.1, we get the set {r 1 , r 3 , r 5 }.
Lastly, we can transform strings into total orders: for σ = σ 1 σ 2 . . . σ n , where for 1 ≤ i ≤ n the letter σ i has index i − 1.
28 We can transform σ to the set
using two nested loops ranging over the letters of σ such that the pair of letters (σ i , σ j ) is added to the set iff i < j. Intuitively, given a selected letter σ i of a string, letters to the right of σ i are larger than σ i , and letters to the left of σ i are smaller than σ i .
Algorithm and Example Calculation
We want to generalise the mapping < D → < SP , defined in Section 3.2 for the case where < D is total, to arbitrary partial orders < D . Furthermore, we want to simultaneously capture all possible linearisations of < D . We now present the algorithm that calculates the generalised mapping < D → < SP in two parts. The first stage of the algorithm is a non-recursive depth first search algorithm that returns the set of all strings representing the rules chosen in accordance with both the preference and the structure as described in Section 4.1.1. This is articulated in Algorithm 2, which defines the function StructurePreference1. This function takes R d , < D as input and returns this set of strings.
The second stage of the algorithm is to turn the output of Algorithm 2 into < SP . This is done by translating each string in the output of Algorithm 2 into a strict total order on R d , and then taking their intersection. This is articulated in Algorithm 3, which defines a function StructurePreference2, which takes as input a set of strings, and calculates < SP . Algorithm 2 Calculating < SP from < D on R d , Part 1 -generate a set of strings, each string is an order of the choice of rules from least preferred (the first letter, on the left) to the most preferred (the last letter, on the right), which essentially corrects < D for the argument structure and then linearises. Recall that in Line 11, * refers to string concatenation. As R d is finite, Algorithm 2 terminates. Throughout, S i is a set of strings, while
S 0 ← {ε} 3:
for i = 0 to N do 5:
for λ ∈ S i do 7:
for t ∈ g R λ do
11:
The intuition of Algorithm 2 is as follows: we initialise the algorithm (Line 2) and iterate N + 1 times (Line 4), where N = |R d | (Line 3). At each iteration Algorithm 2 chooses all of the most preferred applicable rules at that stage. Each choice may render more rules active for the next iterations. It iterates over all such possibilities and repeats this process until the N th iteration, where there are no more rules to be chosen and the algorithm terminates. The result is a set of strings, which are read from right to left, where the right-most letter is the first choice of most preferred applicable defeasible rule, and the left-most letter is the last choice, which usually corresponds to a blocked default.
The intuition of Algorithm 3 is that upon input of this set of strings, the algorithm turns each string into a strict total order over R d as described in the end of Section 4.1.1 (Equation 4.2), and then takes the intersection of all such orders to return < SP . The intersection returns the "core" strict partial order which is the "smallest" change to the original < D that is compatible with all argument structures. Given R d , < D , we define:
This is our method for calculating
Algorithm 3 Calculating < SP from < D on R d , Part 2 -from the set of strings generated from Algorithm 2, we turn each string into a strict total order on R d , and then take their intersection to return < SP . 1: function StructurePreference2(S)
2:
for λ ∈ S do 4:
for r ∈ λ do 6:
if index(r) < index(s) then 8:
orders ← orders ∪ < + SP return orders
and consider the default priority <= {(d 3 , d 2 )}. 29 There are three possible linearisations of < giving two possible extensions:
Let r i := f (d i ) for i = 1, 2, 3 (Equation 3.1). We illustrate these arguments in • For Algorithm 2, we have S 0 = {ε}, N = 3 and i = 0, 1, 2, 3.
When i = 0, S 1 = ∅, λ = ε, T λ = ∅ and R λ = {r 1 , r 3 } = ∅. Therefore, S 1 = {"r 1 ", "r 3 "}. Notice r 3 is a < D -maximal applicable rule, because even though r 3 < D r 2 , r 2 is not applicable until r 1 is applied.
29 Notice this is not the "usual" partial order priority that respects the specificity principle.
When i = 1, S 2 = ∅, and either λ = "r 1 " or λ = "r 3 ". The former gives S 2 = {"r 2 r 1 "} and the latter gives S 2 = {"r 2 r 1 ", "r 1 r 3 "}.
When i = 2, S 3 = ∅, λ = "r 2 r 1 " or λ = "r 1 r 3 ". In the former case, S 3 = {"r 3 r 2 r 1 "}, and in the latter case, S 3 = {"r 3 r 2 r 1 ", "r 2 r 1 r 3 "}.
When i = 3, we get T λ = R d so R λ = ∅, halting the algorithm with output S 3 .
• Given S 3 as input to Algorithm 3, we get the intersection of the words "r 3 r 2 r 1 " and "r 2 r 1 r 3 " when converted to chains, giving < SP = {(r 2 , r 1 )}. Table 1 : The values of < SP given all possible < D of Example 8.
Properties of the Generalised SP Order
We prove some properties of F (Equation 4.3 and Algorithms 2 and 3) that will be useful in proving the representation theorem for the case where < D is a partial order (Theorem 4.11). It can easily be shown that F is a well-defined function from P O (R d ) to itself, where P O (R d ) is the set of all strict partial orders on R d (Section 2.1). We show that the function F :
indeed generalises the definitions in Section 3.2. Recall that T O(X) is the set of all strict total orders on the set X.
Proof. If < D is total, then R λ on Algorithm 2 Line 8 is singleton. This means Line 10 has only one choice in R λ , so S i for all 0 ≤ i ≤ N is singleton. Using the notation of Equation 3.4, Algorithm 2 returns {"a N a N −1 . . . a 2 a 1 "}. This gets transformed into Equation 3.5 through Algorithm 3, which is < SP for the case of < D total.
30 There are 19 partial orders on a set of three labelled elements. 31 We abbreviate the total order r 3 < D r 2 < D r 1 as 321, < D := {(r 1 , r 2 ) , (r 3 , r 2 )} as (12, 32) , and < D = {(r 1 , r 3 )} as 13... etc. and the same applies to < SP . Proof. If < D is itself total, then the output of Algorithm 2 is singleton, which when converted to a chain by Algorithm 3 gives < out =< SP . Therefore, there exists a linearisation of < D , namely itself, such that < out = F (< D ).
If < D is not total, then incomparable rules will cause R λ (Algorithm 2 Line 8) to not be singleton. Each element of R λ will form a distinct element of the output set of Algorithm 2. Choosing a given rule r in R λ to append to the string can also be interpreted as a resolution of this incomparability of < D through a linearisation < + D of < D that ranks r higher than the alternative choices. Reasoning in this way in all cases whenever R λ is not singleton, we obtain a linearisation < 
where the intersection ranges over all linearisations of < D .
Proof. This is immediate from the definition of Algorithm 3 and Theorem 4.2. Table 2 , these input linearisations returns, respectively, 213, 213 and 231. By Corollary 4.3, we get < SP to be the intersection of the sets representing the total orders 213 and 231. This gives (21, 23), which abbreviates < SP = {(r 2 , r 1 ) , (r 2 , r 3 )}. This is consistent with Table 2 .
We now relate the linearisations of the inputs and outputs of Table 1 . 
The linearisation square states that the function F :
Example 11. (Example 10 continued) Consider Table 1 again. Let < D = 31. Let < + D = 321. We know that < SP = (21, 31). We also know that < + SP = 321. Clearly, 321 is a linearisation of (21, 31).
The Generalised Argument Preference Relation for < D Partial
The following result states that changing the partial order PDL default priority < to respect the logical dependencies of defaults while following the preference does not change the PDL extension. This generalises Lemma 3.7 (page 21) to the case where < D is not necessarily total. Proof. Denote Ext(T ) and Ext (T ′ ) to be the sets of extensions of the respective PDTs. We show that Ext(T ) = Ext (T ′ ). (⇒) Let E ∈ Ext (T ) be arbitrary. This means E is the unique extension of some LPDT T + := D, W, < + , where < + ⊇ < is a strict total order. Therefore, 
This means E is the unique extension of some LPDT T + := D, W, < ′ + , where < ′ + ⊇ < ′ is a strict total order. As 
′ . Both PDTs T and T ′ have the same extensions. In the case of T , we have linearisations 312, 132 and 123, with the first linearisation giving E 1 := T h ({a, b}) and the latter two linearisations giving E 2 := T h ({a, ¬b}). In the case of T ′ , we have linearisations 321, 231 and 213, with the first linearisation giving E 1 and the latter two linearisations giving E 2 . Therefore, both T and T ′ have the same extensions.
We can now define the associated set comparison relation from this new < SP just like Equation 3.7: for Γ,
where given the partial order default priority <, order isomorphic to The associated non-strict argument preference is So given a PDT T where the default priority < is not necessarily total, we construct the set of arguments A and define the attack relation ⇀ as in Section 4. We define the non-strict argument preference relation SP as in 
The Representation Theorem for Partial Order Default Priorities
We now generalise Theorem 3.14 to the case where < D is a partial order. Our proof strategy is to leverage as much of Theorem 3.14 as possible. The difference here is that our default priority < ∼ =<D is now partial. In the previous section, we saw how the linearisation square ( D is a linearisation of < D , then the defeat graph of the former is a spanning subgraph of the latter. Further, the unique stable extension in the former case is still a well-defined stable extension in the latter case. The next two sections establish these results, which will then be used to prove the generalised representation theorem.
Linearisation of the Argument Preference Relation and Spanning Subgraphs
Recall from graph theory that G ′ := V, E ′ is a spanning subgraph of G := V, E iff E ′ ⊆ E, and we write G ′ ⊆ span G. For spanning argument subframeworks, stable extensions are preserved as long as you do not add conflicts between arguments in the stable extension. Proof. By assumption, E is cf because it is a stable extension. Let b / ∈ E, then E → ′ b, but as → ′ ⊆ → by definition, we also have E → b. Therefore, E is a stable extension of AF .
Linearising the structure preference order < SP on the rules also linearises the set comparison relation ⊳ SP and the argument preference SP by Lemma 3.4. 
Existence of Stable Extensions in the Partial Order Case
For a PDT T , its defeat graph DG (T ) has stable extensions that do not have to be unique. + has E as its unique PDE. By the representation theorem for LPDTs (Theorem 3.14), there exists a unique stable extension E of DG (T + ) such that Conc (E) = E. By Corollary 3.21, E 2 ∩ ⇀= ∅. DG(T ) differs from DG (T + ) by their argument preference relations, as the attack relation is the same for both. As no attacks are introduced to E, E is also cf in DG(T ) by Equation 2.3. Therefore, by Lemma 4.6, E is also a stable extension of DG(T ). Therefore, DG(T ) also has E as a stable extension.
To show that this stable extension is not in general unique, consider the PDT 
Proof of the Representation Theorem
We prove the representation theorem in this section. Our technique is to relate a partial order on the defaults < with one of its possible linearisations < + , and invoke the first representation theorem (Theorem 3.14) for this linearisation. We know given an extension E of some PDT T there is a linearisation < + of < generating E. We now establish an analogous result on the side of argumentation: for every stable extension E of DG (T ), there is a linearisation < + SP of < SP on R d such that < + SP constructs E via Algorithm 1. We show < + SP exists given < SP by construction, which will make use of a partial linearisation of an order < on P . Let P, < be a poset and U ⊆ P . Let < U :=< ∩U 2 be the partial order < restricted to U . Let < + U be a linearisation of < U on U . We define
where T rCl denotes the transitive closure. It can be shown that given P, < and U , < par U is a strict partial order on P extending <, which is linear when restricted to the set U . Further, < par U is not unique because there could be many possible linearisations of < over U . 33 This construction therefore gives an increasing sequence of partial orders
is a well-defined linearisation of < SP by construction.
To show that < + SP generates E when input into Algorithm 1, consider s i ∈ R − . We assume no defeasible rule is unnecessary, i.e. (∀r ∈ R d ) (∃A ∈ A) r ∈ DR(A). In other words, each defeasible rule is used in some argument.
34 Therefore, there is some argument B i ∈ A such that T opRule (B i ) = s i . By how < SP is defined, s i is the < SP -least rule in DR (B i ). By Lemma 3.12,
We show that for the set of defeasible rules U i associated with rule s i as defined in Equation 4.8, (∀r ∈ DR (A i )) r ∈ U i . Assume for contradiction that (∃r ∈ DR (A i )) r / ∈ U i , then there is some r 0 ∈ DR (A i ), r 0 < i−1 s i . By the properties of Equation 4.7, we can show that r 0 < i−1 s i < i−1 s i−1 < i−1 · · · < i−1 s 1 . Therefore, r 0 cannot be in the sets U j for any j < i, and so could not have been linearised above s j for j < i in any of the previous stages. Therefore, r 0 < SP s i . As s i is < SP -least in DR (B i ) by being the top rule of B i , r 0 / ∈ DR (B i ) and hence there is some rule, r 0 ∈ DR (A i ) − DR (B i ), such that for all rules x ∈ DR (B i ) − DR (A i ), r 0 < SP x. Therfore, A i ≺ SP B i -contradiction, as A i ֒→ B i . Therefore, all the defeasible rules of A i are in U i , and in the linearisation process where < i−1 is linearised over U i into < i such that s i is < i -minimal in U i , we have ensured that at least one defeater of B i will be constructed by Algorithm 1 and included in E prior to the consideration of the rule s i . As i is arbitrary, we have shown that the final linearisation < + SP ensures that all arguments containing rules in R − are defeated and excluded from E. Therefore, Algorithm 1, upon input from < + SP , generates exactly E. We give two concrete examples of the construction of < SP in Lemma 4.10. is already linear on {r 2 } so < 0 =< SP . We then consider nonlower <SP (r 2 ) = {r 1 , r 2 }. We linearise < SP such that r 2 is smaller than all other elements in nonlower <SP (r 2 ), so r 2 < + SP r 1 . This is indeed the linearisation of < SP that generates E 1 . Suppose < SP is such that r 6 < SP r 5 < SP r 4 , r 5 < SP r 3 < SP r 1 and r 3 < SP r 2 . It can be shown that D ≺ SP C ≺ SP B ≺ SP A hence A ֒→ B ֒→ C ֒→ D (notice A ֒→ D as well). The stable extension therefore contains A, C and [⇒ a], so R − = {r 3 , r 6 }. As r 6 < SP r 3 , < SP is already linear on R − , so < 0 =< SP . Now consider nonlower <0 (r 3 ) = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 } and linearise < SP over this set such that r 3 is the smallest element in nonlower <0 (r 3 ), so suppose < 1 is r 3 < 1 r 1 < 1 r 2 < 1 r 4 . Now consider r 6 , but nonlower <1 (r 6 ) = R d and is already linear, so we take < + SP to be the chain 653124 when written in abbreviated form (see Footnote 31, page 37). This < + SP , when input into Algorithm 1, will generate E.
We now apply Lemma 4.10 to prove a more general representation theorem. 
Let E be an extension of T . Then there exists a corresponding stable
extension E ⊆ A of DG(T ) such that Conc (E) = E.
Let E ⊆ A be a stable extension of DG(T ), then Conc(E) is an extension of T .
Proof. Proof of part 1: Let E be an extension of T , then there exists a LPDT T + := D, W, < + where < + is a linerisation of < that generates the extension E (Equation 2.5). Consider the defeat graph DG (T + ). By Theorem 3.14, there exists a stable extension E of DG (T + ) such that Conc (E) = E. Arguing as in the proof of Theorem 4.9 where DG (T + ) ⊆ span DG(T ), E is also a stable extension of DG(T ), and it satisfies Conc (E) = E.
Proof of part 2: Let E be a stable extension, which exists by Theorem 4.9. By Lemma 4.10, there is a linearisation < + SP of < SP such that Algorithm 1 returns E upon input < Under the generalised SP argument preference SP , this representation theorem means that PDL is also sound and complete with respect to its argumentation semantics in the case where the default priority < is not necessarily total.
Satisfaction of Rationality Postulates
In this section we will state and prove a version of Theorem 3.20, which is that the rationality postulates [10] hold for the stable extensions of the defeat graph, instead for all complete extensions. We will discuss the possibility for a general proof in Section 5. Proof. Given T , let E be any stable extension of DG(T ).
1. To show that E is subargument closed, let A ∈ E and let B ⊆ arg A.
Assume for contradiction that B / ∈ E, then E ֒→ B and hence there is some C ∈ E such that C ֒→ B. Therefore, C ֒→ A. This means E is not cf -contradiction. Therefore, B ∈ E as well, and E is thus subargument closed.
2. Theorem 4.11 states that Conc (E) is an extension of T , which is deductively closed. Therefore, Conc (E) is closed under strict rules.
3. As W is consistent and Conc (E) is an extension of T , Conc (E) must also be consistent and its deductive closure is consistent.
In conclusion, all stable extensions are normatively rational. This generalises the rationality theorem (Theorem 3.20) to the case where < D is partial, although only for stable extensions.
Summary
In this section, we have generalised our sound and complete instantiation of ASPIC + to PDL to the case where the default priority is not necessarily a total order. The main challenge is generalising the SP argument preference SP from a total default priority to a partial default priority. We devise a sorting F (< D ) =< SP such that < SP sorts < D in a way that respects the argument structure, the defeasible rule preference < D , and the incomparability of rules (Section 4.1). This preference has the correct properties to preserve the correspondence between the inferences of the underlying PDT and the conclusions of justified arguments (Section 4.2, Theorem 4.11). We have also shown that each stable extension satisfies the rationality postulates (Section 4.3, Theorem 4.12).
Conclusions
We have endowed Brewka's PDL [7] with argumentation semantics using ASPIC + [16] . This is achieved by representing PDL in ASPIC + (Sections 3.1 and 4), discussing which argument preference relations can be suitable for the correspondence of inferences (Sections 3.2 and 4.1), proving that the inferences do correspond under an appropriate preference relation SP (Sections 3.3 and 4.2), and that this instantiation is rational (Sections 3.4 and 4.3). As explained in Section 1, this allows us to interpret the inferences of PDL as conclusions of justified arguments, clarifying the reasons for accepting or rejecting a conclusion. The argumentative characterisation of PDL provides for distributed reasoning in the course of deliberation and persuasion dialogues. This would allow BOID agents with PDL representations of mental attitudes to exchange arguments and counterarguments when deliberating about which goals to select, and thus which actions to pursue [9] .
Related Work
As mentioned in Section 1, there are many existing argumentative characterisations of non-monotonic logics (e.g. [11, 12] ). However, there has been relatively little work in using defeasible rules to represent defaults, because the defeasible components of arguments are often captured in the premises [5, 16] . Reiter's default logic (DL) [19] , as a partial special case 35 of Brewka's PDL [7, Proposition 6], has been endowed with sound and complete argumentation semantics by Dung [11, Section 4.1]. However, DL cannot handle priorities and as a result draws counter-intuitive inferences. We know that conflicts between defaults often occur and priorities are an intuitive and high-level way of resolving such conflicts [7, 8] . It is therefore important to investigate how preferences can also be incorporated into any argumentation semantics. ASPIC + is a good framework to achieve this because it is designed to handle preferences.
Future Work
Brewka's preferred subtheories (PS) [6] has been endowed with argumentation semantics by Modgil and Prakken using ASPIC + [16, Section 5.3.2] . Given that PS is a special case of PDL [6] , it is interesting to see how the argumentation semantics are related. It can be shown that instantiating the argumentation semantics of PDL in this paper to the case of supernormal defaults and empty facts will recover an argumentation semantics isomorphic to the argumentation semantics of Modgil and Prakken. However, whereas Modgil and Prakken assume that arguments must be consistent, the results of Section 3.4.3 lifts this assumption when we specialise our argumentation semantics. We will articulate this in future work.
It will also be interesting to see how an argumentation semantics for Reiter's normal DL [19, Section 3] can be recovered by setting < D = ∅ [7, Proposition 6] , and comparing this to Dung's argumentation semantics for DL. However, Dung's argumentation semantics also accommodates non-normal defaults. How would ASPIC + incorporate non-normal defaults? At first glance it should involve the naming function and undercuts (Section 2.2), but how can soundness and completeness be proven? How can the argumentation semantics help us understand the interaction of explicit default priority relations with the implicit priority of non-normal defaults [21] ? Future work will explore further properties of this argumentation semantics. ASPIC + can be used to generalise PDL. For example, we know that extensions do not have to exist for non-normal default logic, which corresponds to the failure for stable extensions to exist in the argumentation semantics [11, Section 4.1]. We can then consider the justified arguments under different Dung semantics, but what would these other notions of justified arguments mean for PDL?
Another reason for considering different Dung semantics is to show whether the rationality postualtes holds for complete extensions in general. So far we have shown a special case of rationality for the stable extensions only (Section 4.3). What would the complete extensions look like in this case? How are they related to the other Dung semantics [11, Section 2.3]? Alternatively, one can invoke the theory of ASPIC + , which states that normative rationality automatically follows if the instantiation is well-defined with a reasonable argument preference relation [16, Definitions 12 and 18] . Although it is easy to see that our instantiation is well-defined if the underlying PDT is consistent, it is not obvious whether SP in the partial order case is reasonable. This will be the subject of future work.
Finally, we have argued that endowing PDL with argumentation semantics provides for distributed reasoning amongst agents (in particular BOID agents for which PDL has been used to generate individual agents' goals). Such distributed reasoning in the form of dialogue can be formalised as a generalisation of argument game proof theories for Dung frameworks [15] , whereby agents not only can submit arguments, but locutions that implicitly define arguments providing the reasons for a given claim. We will investigate this in future work.
